



Identity Theft, Phishing and Pharming: Accountability & Responsibilities

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NOTE !!

- Some demonstrated phishing techniques are shown in this presentation
- All brands used in the screenshots are fictitious and do not reflect true organizations



Discussion Topics

- Definitions and Statistics
- Malicious Techniques
 - ▶ Phishing
 - ▶ Pharming
 - ▶ Advanced
- Current Security Models
- Best Practices
 - ▶ Technical
 - ▶ Operational



The Demolished Man

Snim trudged downtown to Maiden Lane and cased the banks in that pleasant esplanade ... Snim entered the bank, crossed the crowded main floor to the row of desks opposite the tellers' cages, and stole a handful of deposit slips and a pen.

Snim lurked outside the bank, watching the tellers' cages closely. A solid citizen was making a withdrawal at Cage Z. The teller was passing over big chunks of paper cash. This was the *fish*. Snim hastily removed his jacket, rolled up his sleeves, and tucked the pen in his ear.

As the *fish* came out of the bank, counting his money, Snim slipped behind him, darted up and tapped the man's shoulder.

"Excuse me, sir," he said briskly. "I'm from Cage Z. I'm afraid our teller made a mistake and short-counted you. Will you come back for the adjustment please?" Snim waved his sheaf of slips, gracefully swept the money from the *fish's* fins and turned to enter the bank. "Right this way, sir," he called pleasantly. "You have another hundred coming to you."

As the surprised solid citizen followed him, Snim darted busily across the floor, slipped into the crowd and headed for the side exit. He would be out and away before the *fish* realized he'd been gutted.

Alfred Bester, 1951



Definitions

■ Identity Theft

- ▶ The act of impersonating another, by means of using the person's information

■ Phishing

- ▶ A form of social engineering, characterized by attempts to fraudulently acquire sensitive information

■ Pharming

- ▶ The exploitation of a vulnerability in the DNS server software that allows a hacker to acquire the Domain Name for a site, and to redirect that website's traffic to another web site



APWG Statistics – July 2005

Phishing Reports Received	14,135
Hijacked Brands	71
Number of brands in top 80%	6
Phish targeted at Financial Services	86%
Country hosting most phishing sites	United States
Contain some form of target name	46%
No target name – just IP address	41%
Average time online for site	5.9 days
Longest time online for site	30 days



More Statistics

Estimated number of people who think they got phishing emails in the past year	57 million
Recipients who opened a phishing e-mail	19%
Recipients who divulge personal or financial information to phishers	3 – 5%
People who are duped into acting on a phishing e-mail that was identified as probably fraudulent	1 in 10
At EarthLink, which averages eight unique phishing attacks each month, the cost per attack	> \$40,000
Number of calls in one hour to a top 20 US Bank after a phishing attack	> 90,000




Causes for Growth

- Average web user can be fooled
 - ▶ Websites & branding look official
 - ▶ Social engineering plays on fear
 - ▶ Advanced techniques difficult to detect
- Organizations are only beginning to address the issue
 - ▶ Web and email protections lacking
 - ▶ Communication is inconsistent
- Enforcement and Prosecution is difficult



Common Phishing Attack Methodology

Real Site



From: admin@hackme.com
Subject: Security Alert

Dear HackMe Bank Client,

We are performing system maintenance, which may interfere with access to your Online Services. Due to these technical updates your online account has been deactivated.

Click here to reactivate:


<http://www.hackmebank.com/us/login.asp>

Attacker Data Collection

Name: John Doe
Address: 15 Broadway Ave
SSN: 123 45 6789
CC: 4388 1234 1234 1234
Username: jdoe
Password: password

Name: Jane Doe
Address: 15 7th Ave
SSN: 123 45 6798
CC: 4388 1234 1234 4321
Username: jane.doe
Password: password

Fake Site



Common Email Attack Techniques

- Look & Feel Replication
- Direct Data Collection
- Link Obfuscation
 - ▶ JavaScript Redirection
 - ▶ URL Encoding
 - ▶ Direct IP Address
- Hot linked image



Direct Data Collection

MSN Home | My MSN | Hotmail | Shopping | Money | People & Chat | Sign Out.net | Web Search: Go

msn Hotmail | Today | Mail | Calendar | Contacts | Options | Help

bankclient@hotmail.com | Free Newsletters | MSN Featured Offers

Reply | Reply All | Forward | Delete | Block | Junk | Put in Folder | Print View | Save Address

From : admin@hackmebank.com.com
Sent : Tuesday, October 25, 2004 12:19 PM
To : bankclient@hotmail.com
Subject : HackMe Bank - System maintenance

Technical services of HackMe Bank are performing a planned systems upgrade. We would appreciate your help in logging into your bank account to verify and validate your user information. We certainly appreciate your help and cooperation.

SSN or Customer ID

PIN

Use of this site involves the electronic transmission of personal financial information. Using this product is consent to such transmission of this information; such consent is effective at all times when using this site. Usage of HackMe Bank's online trading services constitutes agreement of the Electronic Services Customer Agreement and License Agreement. HackMe Bank supports both 40-bit and 128-bit browser encryption .



JavaScript Redirection

- `<a href=http://www.legitsite.com
onClick=validate>http://www.legitsite.com`
- `<script>
 function validate() {
 top.location.href =
 http://www.badsite.com;
 return false;
 }
</script>`



URL Encoding

■ Viewed in Source

- ▶ `http://%31%39%35%2E%32%33%39%2E%37%39%2E%31%37%30:%38%37/%73%74/%69%6E%64%65%78%2E%68%74%6D`

■ Resolved by Browser

- ▶ `http://192.239.79.170:87/st/index.htm`

■ Useful sites

- ▶ `http://www.netdemon.net/decode.html`




Hot Linked Image

MSN Home | My MSN | Hotmail | Shopping | Money | People & Chat | Sign Out_{net} | Web Search: Go

msn Hotmail | Today | Mail | Calendar | Contacts | Options | Help

bankclient@hotmail.com | Free Newsletters | MSN Featured Offers


Reply | Reply All | Forward | Delete | Block | Junk | Put in Folder | Print View | Save Address

From : service@hackme.com |  Inbox

Sent : Tuesday, October 25, 2004 12:19 PM

To : bankclient@hotmail.com

Subject : Online Banking and Investing



Dear Hack Me Bank Customer :

It has come to our attention that your account information needs to be updated. If you could please take 5-10 minutes out of your online experience and update your account records, you will not run into any future problems with your online service. However, failure to update your records will result in account suspension. Please update your records in the next 3 business days.

<http://www.hackmebank.com/us/LogiLogin.asp>

Thank you for your time,



Other Communication Attack Techniques

- Instant messages
- Message boards
- Guestbooks
- Blog Comments
- Wireless
- Virus, Trojans
- Etc.




Website Attack Techniques

- Fully spoofed site
- Stolen images
- Browser GUI manipulation
- Framed Keyloggers
- Pop-up / Pop-under
- XSS defacement
- Pharming



Fully Spoofed Site



Stolen Images

The screenshot shows a Microsoft Internet Explorer window titled "Hackme Bank - Microsoft Internet Explorer". The address bar displays "http://www.hackmebank-online.com/us/login.aspx". The main content area shows the "HACKME BANK" logo and a login form with fields for "Username:" and "Password:". A "Privacy Report" dialog box is open in the foreground, displaying the following information:

Privacy Report

Based on your privacy settings, no cookies were restricted or blocked.

Show: All Web sites

Web sites with content on the current page:

Site	Cookies
http://www.hackmebank-online.com/us/login.aspx	
http://www.hackmebank.com/us/images/home1.gif	
http://www.hackmebank.com/us/images/hackmel...	
http://www.hackmebank.com/us/images/search.gif	
http://www.hackmebank.com/us/images/login.gif	
http://www.hackmebank.com/us/images/account.gif	
http://www.hackmebank.com/us/images/contact.gif	

To view a site's privacy summary, select an item in the list, and then click Summary.


[Learn more about privacy...](#)

Buttons: Summary, Settings..., Close


Copyright © 2002, HackMe Bank. All rights reserved.



Browser GUI Manipulation



Framed Keylogger



Pop-up / Pop-under

The image shows a web browser window titled "Hackme Bank - Microsoft Internet Explorer". The browser's address bar is empty. The main content area displays the HackMe Bank logo and a search bar with "SEARCH" and "LOGIN" buttons. Below this, there are navigation links for "Credit Cards", "Insurance", "Lending", and "Money Market". There are also buttons for "PERSONAL BANKING" and "BUSINESS BANKING".


On the left side of the page, there are three promotional links:

- **Open an Account Today!**
Open an instant account in just a few short seconds.
- **Planning on Retirement?**
How much should you save, to make you money last. Managing your retirement.
- **Lo Fir**
Fin
it's s
adv
- **It's**
Try it Online! It's fast, it's easy and it's secure. Get your money from

The pop-up window, outlined in red, is a duplicate of the main page. It contains the same search bar, login button, and login form. The login form has fields for "Username:" and "Password:" and a "LOGIN" button. At the bottom of the pop-up, it says "Copyright © 2002, HackMe Bank All rights reserved." The browser's status bar shows "Local intranet".



XSS Defacement



Pharming

- HOSTS file modification
- DNS Attacks
- Web Cache Poisoning



Pharming: HOSTS File Modification

- Trumps DNS settings
- Virus, trojans, spyware
 - ▶ April, 2005 – 77
 - ▶ May, 2005 – 79
 - ▶ June, 2005 – 154
 - ▶ July, 2005 – 174
- Disable AV update sites
- Advanced techniques
 - ▶ Multi-part



Pharming: DNS Attacks

- Known vulnerabilities
- DNS protocol solely dependant on port and ID
- Techniques
 - ▶ Blind spoofing
 - ▶ PRNG problems
 - ▶ Birthday paradox
 - ▶ DOS attacks
 - October, 2002




Blind Spoofing

- Attacker can not see the query
 - ▶ Must guess the transaction ID and port
- Poor DNS implementations make this easy
 - ▶ Static port configuration
 - ▶ Sequential transaction IDs



PRNG Problems

- Random numbers are not always random
- Some transaction IDs more likely to be used



Linux 2.2
Attack feasibility: < 0.05%



Windows 98 SE
Attack feasibility: 100%




Birthday Paradox

- “If there are 23 people in a room then there is a chance of more than 50% that at least two of them will have the same birthday”
- Conventional logic suggests a transaction ID collision probability of 1 in 65,535
 - ▶ Birthday paradox reduces this probability to only 1 in 700



Web Cache Poisoning

- Coming soon to a phishing pond near you



Hacker taints only pages that interest them. Personal Information is collected and sent to hacker's site using *your* cache server!



Current Security Models

- Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)
 - ▶ Encrypts the data between the server and client
- Web Browser Security
 - ▶ Same origin policy
 - ▶ Cookie flag (httpOnly)
 - ▶ Cookie flag (secure)
- Two Factor Authentication
 - ▶ Something you know / have / are / do
- Consumer Education



Best Practice Responsibilities

- Prevention
- Detection
- Resolution
- Operational Controls



Best Practices: Prevention

■ Technology

- ▶ Web application security
 - Restrict Track / Trace HTTP methods
 - Output Encoding
 - Use “httpOnly” & “secure” cookie flags
 - Break out of frames
 - `if (self != top) top.location = self.location;`
- ▶ Web application firewalls
 - XSS detection
 - Content referrer restrictions
- ▶ Email integrity solutions
 - Digital signatures
 - Email sender verification



Best Practices: Operational Prevention

■ Operational

▶ Customer Education

- Describe how you will interact with them
- Possible ID theft techniques & safeguards

▶ Email Communication

- Be consistent with all customer communication
- Do not ask for personal information

▶ Web

- Blanket SSL
- Two factor authentication
- Domain name consistency



Best Practices: Detection

■ Technology

- ▶ Phishing email monitoring
- ▶ Domain name management
- ▶ Traffic analytics monitoring
- ▶ Internet monitoring

■ Operational

- ▶ Email bounce back analysis
- ▶ Call centers
- ▶ Website feedback



Best Practices: Resolution

■ Counter Measures - Site Take Down

- ▶ ISP communication
- ▶ Contact Email Provider
- ▶ Notify law officials
- ▶ Data Poisoning

■ Fraudulent Site Forensics

- ▶ Owner identification: Email & Website
- ▶ Risk assessment
- ▶ Website characteristics
 - Code, Technologies, ISP, etc.



Best Practices: Operational Controls

- Policy and Procedures
 - ▶ Incident Response Plan
 - ▶ Internal and External Communications Plan
- Prioritization
- Customer Impact Assessment
 - ▶ Customers affected
 - ▶ Financial impact
- Feedback
 - ▶ Learn from each event and improve process and countermeasures



Thank - you

- Questions ?
- Comments ?

